Smartermail 6919 Exploit Better ⟶

A typical default installation of SmarterMail Build 6919 establishes a .NET Remoting architecture. This architecture automatically exposes three separate TCP endpoints over : /Servers /Mail /Spool 2. The Deserialization Mechanism

The refers to a critical vulnerability in SmarterTools SmarterMail (Version 16.x builds prior to 6985) that allows for unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) . This flaw stems from the insecure deserialization of untrusted data through specific .NET remoting endpoints . Technical Breakdown The vulnerability is formally tracked as CVE-2019-7214 .

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Tools like ysoserial.net create a tailored payload using popular gadget chains (such as TypeConfuseDelegate ). This encapsulates a malicious system command within an expected binary object structure.

| Attribute | Detail | |-----------|--------| | | Critical (not officially scored, but impact is SYSTEM‑level RCE) | | Affected Versions | Builds < 6985 (including Build 6919) | | Patch | Build 6985 (August 2019) | A typical default installation of SmarterMail Build 6919

: These endpoints do not properly validate or sanitize serialized .NET commands sent via TCP socket connections .

Public exploit scripts and automated tools like the Rapid7 Metasploit Framework feature modules specifically tailored for this exploit. This flaw stems from the insecure deserialization of

: Security tools scan the target for the SmarterMail web interface (often hosted on port 9998). By inspecting the login page source code or HTTP headers, attackers identify Build 6919 as the running version.

: Because the SmarterMail service typically runs with high permissions, successful exploitation results in full administrative control under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account . Exploitation and Testing

If an attacker transmits a maliciously crafted, serialized object payload (often generated using utility tools like ysoserial.net ), the .NET Framework’s data handlers decode it. This forces the application to unexpectedly execute arbitrary system commands embedded deep within the object's properties. Anatomy of the Attack on Build 6919